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ABSTRACT: Computers have been used to support human decision-making for several decades, and 
increasingly, formal argumentation models are being used in their design.  However, their use raises a 
number of conceptual and social-ethical questions that have yet to be fully addressed.  We explore some 
questions raised by two current proposals for computer-mediated argumentation and decision-making, in 
particular the assessment of substantive quality, inclusiveness, and noncoerciveness, as these bear on 
legitimate policy decisions.  
1. Introduction 
Human reliance on computer technology is by now a well-established cultural fact.  Indeed, 
we now rely on computers even for certain forms of decision-making: so-called “knowledge-
based expert systems,” or “decision support systems,” have been developed over the last thirty or 
so years to support, or sometimes even replace human decision-making (Alty and Coombs 1984; 
Buchanan and Shortliffe 1984).  As the name suggests, expert systems attempt to automate (by 
means of a knowledge base and inference mechanisms) the knowledge and reasoning skills of 
experts in a given domain, such as medical diagnosis, marketing decisions, and so on.1  In this 
essay we are concerned with recent attempts to develop decision-support systems for processes 
of public policy argumentation.  Like earlier expert systems, these argumentation-support 
systems incorporate both knowledge bases and inference mechanisms.   Unlike the earlier 
systems, however, they place greater emphasis on the processes used for reasoning and inference 
than on the database of knowledge from which conclusions are drawn; thus we might designate 
them as “argumentation systems” in contrast to the earlier “knowledge systems.”2  Dialectical 
approaches in particular have drawn attention in this developing area of Artificial Intelligence 
research.3  Indeed, some commentators have recommended the employment of such systems, via 
the Internet, to enable democratic participation in public policy decision-making processes  (e.g. 
Ess 1996).  The kind of argumentation systems we examine here are noteworthy for their attempt 
                                                 
1 For an introduction, see Benfer, Brendt, and Furbee 1990. 
2 One can discern a natural evolution from knowledge systems to argumentation systems in the increasing 
concern with providing users with the underlying explanation for the system’s conclusion (or advice).  Although 
developers of knowledge systems sought from the start to have their systems explain or justify their conclusions, 
early expert systems offered little in the way of explanation beyond high-level traces of the inference rules invoked 
in the chain of reasoning (Jackson 1986). Applications using some model of argumentation have included systems 
for:  medical domains (Krause et al. 1995, Fox and Das 2000); legal domains (Gordon 1994, Verheij 1998, Bench-
Capon et al. Forthcoming); public policy decision support (Gordon and Karacapilidis 1997, Gordon et al. 1997, 
Karacapilidis et al. 1997); geopolitical risk prediction (Seffers 1998); scientific discourse (McBurney and Parsons 
2000,2001c); software design (Stathis 2000); and autonomous agent dialogues (Parsons et al. 1998, Sierra et al. 
1998, Dignum et al. 2000).  Carbogim et al. (2000) present a review of such applications 
3 For example, Dung (1995) proposed dialectical argumentation within AI as a proof theory for non-monotonic 
reasoning; for a review of this area, see Prakken and Vreeswijk 2001.  For broad overviews of developments in 
computational dialectics, see Walton 2000, Reed and Norman, forthcoming. 
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to draw explicitly upon dialectical theories of argumentation as a framework for processes of 
public deliberation involving multiple parties and interests.  
The use of argumentation systems to assist public deliberation raises a number of conceptual 
and social-ethical questions that have yet to be fully addressed.4  On the one hand, argumentation 
systems provide a deliberative forum whose results can advise and, one hopes, improve the 
quality of decisions.  If appropriately designed, such systems should be able to assist debate by 
tracking the various claims and arguments, by searching databases for relevant information, and 
by continually updating and assessing the overall state of the debate. They thereby help 
participants argue in a dialectically responsible manner, while offering them ample scope for 
modifying aspects of the system, such as the stock of inference rules and proof standards.   On 
the other hand, the highly qualitative and publicly controverted character of public policy 
argumentation poses serious questions about what would constitute an “appropriate design.” In 
this paper we aim to clarify the criteria for an appropriately designed argumentation system.  To 
focus and concretize the discussion, we start by describing, in Section 2, two current proposals 
for computer-mediated argumentation and decision-making, the Zeno system of Gordon and 
Karacapilidis and their colleagues at the German National Research Centre for Information 
Technology and the Risk Agora of McBurney and Parsons.  In Section 3 we elaborate the basic 
evaluative dimensions appropriate for the deliberative contexts in which such systems are to be 
used.  In the subsequent sections we indicate how one might apply these deliberative criteria for 
assessing the two argumentation systems.  As we shall see, the critical assessment of 
argumentation-support systems must draw upon an understanding of the discursive bases of 
responsible public legitimation and must acknowledge inherent limits on what formal design 
features can achieve for legitimation. 
2. Two Argumentation-Based Decision Support Systems 
2.1 
We begin by describing the two argumentation systems.  The first is the Zeno system of the 
German National Research Centre for Information Technology  (GMD) (Gordon and 
Karacapilidis 1997, Gordon et al. 1997, Karacapilidis et al. 1997).    Zeno was developed to 
support decision-making in urban planning, as part of a larger European Community-funded 
project to develop innovative information systems infrastructure for public collaborative 
environmental planning.  In these domains, there are multiple interested parties, with diverse 
professional or private backgrounds, interests, preferences and viewpoints, and they are often 
geographically dispersed.  Because the application domain of Zeno involves urban planning 
decisions, the system has to integrate information which is spatially indexed with information 
which is not.  And because the users may be diverse and geographically distributed, the system 
requires intuitive and easy-to-use interfaces, provided, preferably, across an internet platform.  
Neither of these elements of software design was technically straightforward, but these issues 
will not concern us here.  Our focus is on the argumentation and decision support elements of 
Zeno. 
                                                 
4 As Haklay notes in a forthcoming review of information technology for environmental decision-making, the 
philosophical and ethical aspects of information systems design are rarely made explicit or even explored (Haklay 
Forthcoming).  Cf. also Feenberg 1999. 
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The developers of Zeno define their system as “a mediation system”: 
“a kind of computer-based discussion forum with particular support for argumentation.  In addition to the 
generic functions for viewing, browsing and responding to messages, a mediation system uses a formal 
model of argumentation to facilitate retrieval, to show and manage dependencies between arguments, to 
provide heuristic information focusing the discussion on solutions which appear most promising, and to 
assist human mediators in providing advice about the rights and obligations of the participants in formally 
regulated decision making procedures.” (Gordon and Karacapilidis 1997, p. 10). 
The argumentation model used by Zeno is a formal version of the informal Issue-Based 
Information System (IBIS) model of Rittel and Webber (1973), modified for the urban-planning 
domain.  The IBIS model identifies several atomic elements of a discourse:  Issues, the topic 
about which a discussion is conducted; Positions, which express some statement relevant to an 
issue; and Arguments, which present statements in favour or against particular Positions.  Thus 
(using an example from Karacapilidis et al. 1997), an Issue may be: “Which site should the 
airport be located?”; Positions may then be statements designating different alternative sites, or 
groups of possible sites; and Arguments may be positive and/or negative attributes about these 
site alternatives and statements, such as: “Has easy access” or “Is private land.”  Each element of 
this model can be attached to each other element at any time, so that, for example, a new issue 
can be raised at any point in a discussion, thus creating a subsidiary discussion on the new issue.   
The IBIS model is well-suited for the display of a discussion as a hierarchical graph; the 
implementation of hypertext links enables a user to move easily around this graph from one 
thread of a discussion to another, or to access background data, supporting documents or 
contextual information, etc, associated with any element of the discussion.  Among the 
objectives of the Zeno project is to enable snapshots of a debate:  “One important goal is to 
provide easy access to the current state of the planning process, at any time.” (Gordon et al. 
1997, Section 2).    In order to provide for these, the designers of Zeno modified the IBIS model 
to permit the expression of preferences.  Positions have the form of logical propositions but they 
do not have a context-independent truth status.  Their meaning is defined by their role in a 
particular thread of discussion.  Preferences are defined as particular types of positions with an 
internal structure of comparison of two (non-preference) positions.  For example, two planning 
options for siting an airport, such as “public site” and “easy access” might enter into a preference 
that considers easy access as “more important than” a public site.  This preference then 
constitutes a qualitative constraint, which may or may not be supported by further arguments 
(i.e., positions), and which may or may not be consistent with other constraints.  These 
preferences and constraints, being positions, may themselves be the subject of discussion, via the 
articulation of arguments and the raising of further issues.  
Zeno provides users with an overview of the argumentative status of positions, preferences, 
and constraints. By considering to extent to which each position satisfies the articulated 
constraints, Zeno permits positions to be labeled as acceptable or not at any time in a discussion.  
These position-labels can then be aggregated in various ways to assign labels to Issues, and Zeno 
does this to indicate the extent to which their current argument support meets defined standards 
of proof.  The Zeno developers argue that no set of proof-standards is applicable across all 
application domains, and so they adopted a set of five labels from the field of jurisprudence, 
namely:  (1) Scintilla of Evidence; (2) Preponderance of Evidence; (3) No Better Alternative; (4) 
Best Choice; and (5) Beyond a Reasonable Doubt (Gordon and Karacapilidis 1997).  Each label 
is provided with a formal definition in terms of the presence or absence of positions and 
  
Computer Decision-Support Systems For Public Argumentation: Criteria For Assessment 4 
arguments (although these definitions are not claimed to be instantiations of the legal definitions 
of these terms).  With this argumentation structure, it is then straightforward for the system to 
present to a user the current status of a discussion and to show this as it changes.  
The designers of Zeno identify the generic speech acts involved in contributing to a 
discussion, for example, “Raise an issue”, “Assert a position”, “State a preference”, etc (Gordon 
and Karacapilidis 1997).  However, they do not, in the work published to date, articulate a 
definitive list of such speech acts or the rules that govern their use.  By contrast, our second 
example of an argumentation system, the Risk Agora of McBurney and Parsons 
(2000,2001b,2001c) is fully specified in this manner, and we now discuss this system. 
2.2 
The Risk Agora has been proposed as a system to support deliberations over the potential 
health and environmental risks of new chemicals and substances, and the appropriate regulation 
of these substances.  Determination of these issues typically first involves debate within the 
relevant scientific community over whether or not a significant correlation exists between the 
putative chemical cause and any observed health effects, and then, if a significant relationship is 
identified, a subsequent debate in the wider community over the consequences of alternative 
regulatory options then occurs.  Initial development of the system (McBurney and Parsons 2000, 
2001c) has focused on the first of these debates, the scientific debate, where the designers 
adopted explicit philosophies of science and of rational discourse.  The philosophy of science 
they draw on is Pera’s three-person game model of science, where progress is made through the 
work of, firstly, scientists undertaking experiments, whose experiments provoke reactions from, 
secondly, Nature, whose responses are in turn mediated through, thirdly, the scientific 
community (Pera 1994).  Because the members of the scientific community are (presumed to be) 
rational and willing participants in the process, and because the assertions in these scientific 
discourses are all subject to contestation and defence, the authors adopt a philosophy of rational 
discourse for such debates.  For this they draw on Habermas’s theory of discourse ethics 
(Habermas 1983/1991), whose rules were first fully articulated by Alexy (1978/1990), and the 
principles of rational mutual inquiry of Hitchcock (1991).   
Within this framework, the authors then articulate the locutions and rules of a dialogue-
game, in the style of Hamblin (1971) and MacKenzie (1979), specifying the pre-conditions 
necessary for the execution of each locution and the changes each locution effects.  The locutions 
of this game permit assertion, contestation and defence of propositions, modes of inference, 
assumptions and consequences, in what is essentially a persuasion dialogue (Walton and Krabbe 
1995).  Certain locutions incur requirements on the speaker to defend a statement if subsequently 
contested, and the formalism permits this to be in the form of an argument for the statement.  
Statements, assumptions, consequences and modes of inference may all be asserted with an 
attached modality, expressing the speaker’s degree of confidence in the assertion.   As in the 
Hamblin games, Commitment stores track assertions made in the course of the debate.  
McBurney and Parsons have also begun the task of the detailed specification of a system to 
support discussion over regulatory options (McBurney and Parsons 2001b).  In this work, they 
have drawn on Habermas’s theory of communicative action (Habermas 1981/1984) to define 
types of locutions (i.e., speech acts) appropriate for such discussions.  Because these discussions 
are about actions, their formalization as dialogue games requires models of deliberation 
dialogues (Walton and Krabbe 1995), which is the subject of another paper at this OSSA meeting 
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(Hitchcock, McBurney and Parsons 2001).  Thus, the work of specifying the Agora to support 
regulatory debates is on-going.  
Unlike the Zeno system, the Risk Agora is not intended to support debates in real-time, and 
the designers have also not yet developed the intuitive, graphical interfaces present in Zeno.  
Rather, the Agora is intended to formally model and represent debates in the risk domain, so as: 
“1. To understand the logical implications of the scientific knowledge relating to the particular issue, and 
the arguments concerning the consequences and value-assignments of alternative regulatory options. 
2.  To consider the various arguments for and against a particular claim (including regulatory options), 
how these arguments relate to each other, their respective degrees of certainty, and their relative strengths 
and weaknesses. 
3.  To develop an overall case for a claim, combining all the arguments for it and against it. 
4.  To enable interested members of the public to gain an overview of the debate on an issue. 
5.  To support group deliberation on the issue, for example in Citizens’ Panels. 
6. To support risk assessment and regulatory determination by government regulatory agencies.” 
(McBurney and Parsons 2001b).  
Although the Risk Agora has different aims from Zeno, its designers also desire to enable 
snap-shots of a debate to be taken at any time.  This requirement has added importance in the 
risk domain, where regulatory decisions must be made even though a final determination of the 
state of scientific knowledge on a particular issue is not possible.  For this reason, and like Zeno, 
the Agora defines a set of labels which are attached to each claim on the basis of the arguments 
presented for and against the claim up to that time.  Probable claims, for example, are those for 
which an argument has been presented in the Agora, but for which no rebutting arguments 
(arguments for the negation of the claim) or undercutting arguments (arguments for negations of 
an assumption or an intermediate premise) have been presented.   In this way, the dialectical 
status of a claim can be assessed at any time, thus providing a snapshot of the debate to that time.  
The designers of the Agora then examine the likelihood that a snapshot, taken at some finite time 
after commencement of a debate, is indicative of the longer-term state of the debate, assuming 
such a stable state is achieved.  They show that the Agora has desirable properties when used for 
inference from finite snapshots to longer-term states in this way (McBurney and Parsons 2001c).    
3. Dimensions for Evaluating Argumentation Systems 
Along what dimensions might one analyze and evaluate such systems?  For software 
systems designed for well-defined, decomposable and measurable tasks, such as those for the 
production of bills for use of an electricity network, for example, assessment of system 
competence and quality is straightforward; standardized methods have been developed, are in 
widespread use, and influence good software design (e.g. Kirwan and Ainsworth 1993).  
However, as Parker (2000) observes, these methods are inapplicable for most decision support 
systems, since most decisions and decision-processes are not amenable to such reductionist task 
analysis.  She further notes that no methods have been developed for decision support systems.5 
                                                 
5 However, see the references in note 6 below.  Parker (2000) proposes a design methodology based on the 
types of questions likely to be asked by a user of the system.  While promising, this approach seems more 
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Perhaps it is because decisions are not amenable to reductionist analysis that relatively little 
attention has been paid in the Artificial Intelligence community to the question of the quality of 
decision support systems.  Groothuis and Svensson, in research presented as recently as 
December 2000 and investigating the quality of computer-supported welfare assistance decisions 
in the Netherlands, say:  “To our knowledge this is the first investigation into the extensive use of 
expert systems in the daily practice of handling a very complex administrative task” (Groothuis 
and Svensson 2000, p. 9).   
It is true that designers of what we have termed knowledge systems — expert systems that 
encode some body of expertise — will typically compare performance of the system against a 
group of human experts through a number of test cases.6  However, such comparisons are fraught 
with difficulties.  In some domains, what counts as “expertise” may be open to dispute, or 
subject to cultural and contextual variation.7  In other domains, normative decision theory (e.g., 
Lindley 1985) does not reflect the decision methods people actually use.  Although one may 
simply take this as an illustration of deficiency of human decision-makers, in some cases one 
may not have any means of assessing the normative methods as superior.8  Moreover, normative 
decision theories have tended to focus only on those elements that are quantifiable, and so may 
ignore much that is salient to good decision-making (cf. Rehg 1997a).  Assessing the quality of 
advice-giving systems poses further specific difficulties.  If advice is not taken, is it necessarily 
of low quality or unhelpful to the decision-maker?  And how does one assess the quality of 
advice if the world changes in a salient way between the giving of the advice and its execution?9  
                                                                                                                                                             
appropriate for what we have termed knowledge systems (those encoding expert knowledge) than for argumentation 
systems. 
6 E.g., Buchanan and Shortliffe 1984; in chap. 30 of this work, the authors consider quality evaluation methods 
for decision support systems.  Greenberg (1987) also considers evaluation issues for such systems, focusing his 
discussion on the validation of the inference rules used by the system.  Taylor (1991) briefly discusses evaluation 
questions as part of an exploration of the wider organizational issues associated with deployment of these systems. 
7 For example, the SimCoast expert system of the UK’s Centre for Coastal and Marine Sciences, for example, 
was developed to provide assistance to marine coastal environment decision-makers in developing nations 
(McGlade 1999).  However, the expertise encoded in the system embodies a specific Weltanschauung, that of a 
standardized western scientific ontology, which may not accord with the worldviews or ontologies of non-scientist 
users in the developing world.  Moreover, Western expertise may actually distort the perception of the local reality, 
as shown by the example of deforestation in West Africa (Fairhead and Leach 1998; cf. Harding 1998). Using 
developing-country residents as the “experts” for the design phase may well have led to a different system. 
8 There has been considerable research on this variance (see, e.g., Nisbett and Ross 1980; Kahneman et al. 
1982).  In a recent review of the limited research into how people make important medical decisions, Schneider 
concluded that patients make decisions quite differently from experts or normative decision theory; however, we 
have few means to measure the quality of medical decisions. Selecting one procedure or course of treatment usually 
precludes the selection of alternatives, and so strict comparison of results of alternative decision options at an 
individual level is impossible.  The diversity and complexity of individual circumstances and medical aetiologies 
make comparisons at an aggregated level also problematic (Schneider 1998, pp. 92, 97). 
9 Developers of public mobile satellite communications networks such as Iridium and ICO, for example, had 
lead times of a decade for designing, manufacturing and deploying the innovative satellite technology they required 
(McBurney and Parsons 2001a).  To guide this work, the intending investors sought the advice of market researchers 
on the size of the potential market for mobile satellite services.  In the particular decade concerned (1989-1999) 
demand for terrestrial cellular services grew much faster than anyone had forecast at the outset of the period, to the 
detriment of demand for mobile satellite services at the end of the decade.  In major part this growth in terrestrial 
cellular demand was spurred by technological changes and the spread of cellular network coverage unanticipated in 
  
Computer Decision-Support Systems For Public Argumentation: Criteria For Assessment 7 
Still further difficulties are raised by the fact that advice is often linked with certain contextual 
limitations or caveats, which users sometimes ignore.10  How does one assess the quality of 
advice in such cases?  Finally, how does one assess advice for extreme situations or rare 
events?11 
Beneath the foregoing methods of assessment and their vicissitudes lurks a shared 
assumption, namely that there is a correct or right or “true” decision to be reached by following a 
set of context-independent (albeit domain-specific) inference rules.  However, if assessments 
based on this straightforward model run into difficulties for knowledge systems, we should 
expect even greater difficulties when we attempt to evaluate argumentation systems for public 
deliberative domains that involve multiple interested parties and highly complex value-laden 
issues.  Decisions over urban planning policies, for example, may have no inherent, or 
independently accessible truth or correctness, since any viewpoint from which we may judge 
them will invariably be partial and never completely disinterested; only the process used to reach 
the decision can tell us whether or not it deserves to stand (Forester 1999; Bohman 1996).   
Although the intended applications are different, both Zeno and the Risk Agora seek to 
support deliberative decision-making by multiple participants in a public policy domain.  Given 
the difficulties we have just sketched, any evaluation of argumentation systems such as Zeno or 
the Agora must begin with a more sophisticated understanding of the relevant kind of decision-
making at issue: specifically, assessment criteria must draw not only upon argumentation theory 
but also on an understanding of public policy formation.  Our analysis thus takes as its point of 
departure Forester’s deliberative approach (1999, chap. 6) to mediated public policy formation 
and dispute resolution.  The key to this approach lies in its understanding of deliberation as a 
process that is both transformatory and reasonable, and thus able to generate legitimate 
decisions, which is to say: rationally and publicly acceptable decisions.  There are four major 
                                                                                                                                                             
1989.  Was the advice given by the market researchers wrong because it did not predict unanticipated events, or, if 
anticipated, did not sufficiently emphasize unlikely events?  The advice may not have been wrong if the world had 
been otherwise in the subsequent decade.  Most management consultancy is not assessable or assessed for these two 
reasons (an observation based on the second author’s decade of experience as a management consultant). 
10 In the one quality assessment of decision support systems known to us, Groothuis and Svensson (2000) 
assessed the quality of decisions made with the help of computer systems in the provision of welfare assistance in 
the Netherlands, comparing the actual determination reached in a sample of welfare assistance cases with the 
decision which should have been made under the relevant laws.  The results of this assessment showed that decision 
quality varied according to the extent to which the system provided support for the complex administrative tasks 
involved.  For those cases where the system provided full support, few human errors were made; in other cases, 
where only limited support was provided, decision errors were more frequent.  The authors concluded that this was 
due to the human decision-makers trusting the advice of the system even when such trust was not warranted, thus 
revealing weaknesses in the human decision-makers rather than in the decision support systems. 
11 For example, a system designed to support water-flow management through a dam will only be required to 
recommend responsive actions for 200-year floods on average once every 200 years.  There may be insufficient data 
to design the system or to predict its performance in these circumstances, and possibly only one case every 200 
years on which to base a live assessment of that performance.   Moreover, if a system is designed for an entirely new 
activity how does one assess the adequacy of its advice?  The various intelligent agent systems currently being 
deployed by NASA for control of autonomous spacecraft are examples of systems which undertake completely new 
activities.  How is it possible to rate their performance in any other but crude terms, such as overall mission success 
versus non-success? (NASA 1999) 
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criterial considerations or dimensions that issue from a deliberative approach.  In this section we 
elucidate these dimensions, before applying them to Zeno and the Agora in subsequent sections. 
3.1 
A deliberative model of policy formation contrasts with the conventional pluralist model 
that conceived public policy questions as matters for negotiation and bargaining.12  Deliberative 
approaches deny that all public issues and choices reduce to bargaining (Bohman and Rehg 
1997).  Although decisions over the division of scarce resources, or involving the conflict of 
particular (non-generalizable) interests, are typically resolved by resort to negotiations or 
bargaining, decisions over what actions to take in some circumstance require deliberations (cf. 
Walton and Krabbe 1995; Habermas 1996, chap. 4).  According to Forester, mediators should 
approach public planning and policy formation as deliberations.  This approach has important 
implications for what one expects of both the process and its possible outcomes.  As a number of 
democratic theorists have argued (e.g., Elster 1986; Michelman 1988), deliberative political 
processes, unlike negotiations, require participants to adopt a civic standpoint oriented toward 
the transformation of individual preferences and interests in the direction of reaching agreement 
on a common good or general interest.  Forester (1999, p. 184) calls this “the self-transformative 
condition.”  Whereas participants in negotiations enter the decision-making process with their 
preferences fully-formed and aim to achieve a compromise position that balances competing 
preferences, participants in deliberations may learn from each other and even from the very fact 
of interacting.   As Michelman elsewhere defined it: 
“Deliberation . . . refers to a certain attitude toward social cooperation, namely, that of openness to 
persuasion by reasons referring to the claims of others as well as one's own.  The deliberative medium is a 
good faith exchange of views – including participants' reports of their own understanding of their 
respective vital interests –  . . . in which a vote, if any vote is taken, represents a pooling of judgments.” 
(Michelman 1989, p. 293) 
Because of this openness to change, participants to a deliberation – assuming they are 
rational – should be willing to share information, a strategy that may not be in the self-interests 
of participants to a negotiation.  To the extent that participants are unwilling to share their 
knowledge and preferences, we may consider the decision-process to be a negotiation rather than 
a deliberation.13   
Within this deliberative approach we identify three further dimensions of analysis.  To begin 
with, we want self-transformation to be reasonable: if participants change their views in response 
to others’ input, then these changes should lead toward a substantively better outcome.  Thus we 
must examine the properties of topic-specific considerations stemming from the particular 
question or dispute, which determine the adequacy conditions for high quality outcomes (3.2).  
However, as we shall see, substantive quality cannot be assessed independently of considerations 
bearing on the participants and their roles (3.3), which in turn point to difficult questions 
                                                 
12 For a well-known statement of the pluralist model, which draws on James Madison’s Federalist Paper no. 
10, see Dahl 1956. 
13 In Hitchcock et al. (2001), the characteristic of sharing information is taken to be one that distinguishes 
deliberation from negotiation dialogues.  In contrast, because much of the research focus in the area of intelligent 
multi-agent software systems has been on automated negotiation (Jennings et al. 2001), this self-transformative 
condition is not satisfied by all agent systems.  
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concerning the process itself and its “vulnerability to insinuations of power” (Forester 1999, p. 
177) (3.4).   
3.2 
For any particular dispute resolution or policy question, one can identify specific 
considerations tied to the particular issue or dispute at stake, and an adequate deliberative 
outcome must, presumably, take all these relevant considerations—or at the least, those which 
are most pressing or salient—into account.  An environmental dispute, for example, will 
typically turn on particular scientific facts about the ecosystem in question, fallible 
prognostications about the impact of different alternative actions on that ecosystem, and 
economic assessments about the costs and benefits of different options for different affected 
parties.  In addition, one can also expect that the parties will disagree over quality-of-life issues, 
fundamental goods and values (aesthetic beauty vs. economic growth, for example), and even, at 
a deeper level, over basic ontologies and worldviews (Kriesberg et al. 1989; Rehg 1999).  How 
well a deliberation addresses the range of relevant considerations determines the quality of its 
outcome.  In effect, the reasonable processing of all relevant considerations—the pertinent 
questions and objections—determines what counts as an adequate outcome.   
The idea of relevance obviously plays a crucial role in this context—but what does it 
involve?  Although the conception of argumentative relevance is very much an open research 
question (Johnson 2000, pp. 199—204), the factual dimensions of policy argument suggest, on 
the one hand, a process-independent conception: a consideration is relevant if failure to take it 
into account in a deliberation can lead to an unsuccessful policy.  On the other hand, relevance is 
also partly internal to the deliberative process: at least some kinds of considerations, such as 
interests and values, must be relevant for the participants if they are to be relevant at all.   
This twofold conception of relevance points toward a more precise characterization of the 
substantive quality of an outcome or decision.  Note, to begin with, that substantive quality 
should probably not be reduced to “truth.”  Rather, given the complexity of the various relevant 
considerations, one does better to characterize substantive adequacy in terms of the rational 
legitimacy and subsequent success of a policy choice (cf. Habermas 1996; Rehg 1997b).  The 
standard of success stems from the external aspect of relevance.  Because policy decisions partly 
rest on factual assumptions, policies can, in some sense, fail to be “correct,” given the way the 
world actually is. An environmental dispute resolution may rest on false scientific assumptions, 
or it may depend on an economic forecast that proves mistaken.  To this extent, the renewed 
interest of argumentation theorists in truth is not entirely misplaced (Goldman 1999, chap. 5; 
Johnson 2000).  But in policy-making contexts, factual claims intertwine with other sorts of 
reasons, for which the predicates of “true” versus “false” may be less appropriate than something 
like “justified”—and thus reasonable—versus “arbitrary.”  Consequently, what matters is that, in 
taking all the relevant considerations into account, participants construct and reconstruct their 
viewpoints in a manner that is not only logically consistent but, more importantly, dialectically 
responsible, or “responsive”  (Goldman 1994).  To put this idea in a nutshell, participants hold a 
dialectically responsible position insofar as they have addressed all the relevant questions and 
objections and thereby reached the most plausible outcome relative to the alternatives.   
One may, to be sure, link dialectically responsible positions with a broadened notion of 
truth, for example along the lines of Rescher’s dialectical account of plausible reasoning or 
Hintikka’s game-theoretic semantics (Rescher 1976; 1977; Hintikka, 1968).  According to such 
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approaches, claims that hold up in a process of dialectical reasoning as more plausible, or that 
have the support of a winning strategy for the given argumentation system, enjoy a (defeasible) 
presumption of truth, relative to the appropriate burden of proof.  Arguably, this concept of 
“truth” is applicable to many, if not most, decisions in the public policy domain, including the 
application domains for both Zeno and the Risk Agora. 
In any case, the internal aspect of relevance is closely linked with dialectical responsibility, 
and thereby with rational legitimacy.  For unless the relevant considerations are addressed to the 
satisfaction of the affected parties, policy decisions are not likely to be considered legitimate.  
Inasmuch as deficits in legitimacy tend to have a negative effect on compliance with decisions, 
the dialectical quality of a deliberative outcome is also crucial for its successful implementation 
(see Lind and Tyler 1988).  Thus, substantive quality of the deliberation—its adequacy in taking 
all the relevant considerations into account—naturally leads into the question of participant 
inclusiveness, how well a process has given the various affected parties the chance to voice their 
concerns and affect the outcome.  This takes us into the third and fourth dimensions of 
evaluation. 
3.3 
To address the issue of inclusive participation, we must characterize the involved parties and 
their roles. Here, we may first ask how many people are involved in the decision-process being 
supported by the computer system; the number involved may influence the model of 
argumentation that is appropriate.  As Forester’s case studies (1999) makes clear, public policy 
deliberations may involve numerous parties with quite different perspectives and interests.  
Including all the affected parties and giving them voice in the deliberation is crucial to the 
legitimacy and consequent success of such deliberations.  But evaluating argumentation systems 
for overt or “formal” exclusions—exclusions that are explicit in the distribution of roles and 
entitlements--only goes part way.  More important are those subtle forms of exclusion and 
coercion that might be built into the design itself as a system of rules.  This issue brings us to the 
role of the system in deliberation, in particular the power of the system in fostering or impeding 
the expression and reasonable processing of information and viewpoints—an issue we take up 
under the fourth evaluative dimension.14 
3.4 
A legitimate deliberative process must not only grant all the affected parties entrance but 
also give them effective opportunities to voice their opinions and, still further, foster the 
participants’ capacity for learning from one another.  Only in this way will the outcome represent 
a generally acceptable resolution of the dispute or question at issue.  This dimension of 
evaluation thus requires us to examine how well a deliberative design, precisely as an 
interaction, fosters a collective, rational learning process, such that reasonable and generally 
acceptable—and thus legitimate—outcomes are more likely.  In particular, we must scrutinize 
deliberation for subtle forms of exclusion and for potential obstructions in the participants’ 
                                                 
14 See Bohman 1996, esp. chap. 3. Even a technology as apparently benign as literacy can be used by those 
possessing it to establish and maintain political power, as Bledsoe and Robey (1986) show in their study of Arabic 
literacy among the Mende of Sierra Leone. 
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capacity for learning from one another.  This dimension of analysis thus complements and goes 
beyond the dimensions of substantive quality and overt (or formal) participant inclusiveness.   
In other words, we are concerned here above all with the freedom that participants have to 
express their views and learn from one another in a reasonable manner.  Thus, the fourth 
dimension of analysis scrutinizes deliberative processes for their freedom from domination or 
coercion, whether the coercion issues from the external pressures that inhibit the exchange of 
views or from internal psychological mechanisms.  Forester (1999, p. 184) terms this the 
“noncoercive condition” on deliberative participation.  We shall thus have to examine the two 
argumentation systems for the kinds of power they exert on the public deliberation they assist.  If 
such systems in some sense “mediate” or at least facilitate deliberation, then they wield 
considerable power over the process and its outcome.  As Forester (1999, p. 180) points out: “If 
parties to public dispute-resolution processes not only construct agreements but reconstruct 
themselves—in part as a result of being exposed to new information, in part as a result of the 
constellation of participants—then the political significance and power of the mediator-
facilitator’s role is more important to understand than ever before” (Forester 1999, p. 180).     
4. Deliberative Self-Transformation  
We now turn to a brief assessment of each of the two systems, Zeno and the Risk Agora, in 
terms of the four categories sketched above in Section 3.  Our intention in these remaining 
sections is not to provide an exhaustive assessment, but simply to sketch some of the more 
obvious moves, as an illustration of the basic idea.  The first dimension of evaluation concerned 
the self-transformative character of deliberative processes.  Here we note briefly that, at least on 
the surface, or in terms of their formal design features, both argumentation systems are designed 
to allow for deliberative self-transformation and not for bargaining or negotiation.15  Because the 
Risk Agora is not intended to support real-time debates, its “participants” may in fact be 
representatives of positions, rather than real persons.  However, the system does allow retraction 
of claims previously asserted or accepted, and thus permits self-transformation.  For Zeno, in the 
paper that describes the model of decision-making used in the domain, revision of constraints is 
explicitly permitted so as to eliminate any inconsistencies in these (Gordon et al. 1997).  
However, because precise dialogue rules have not been presented, it is not clear how this 
revision process is undertaken.  It is also unclear if participants may revise their statements of 
other preferences, positions or arguments, as there do not appear to be specific locutions for 
retraction of previous statements. 
5. Substantive Quality 
The analysis of substantive inclusiveness developed in Section 3.2 suggests that, to begin 
with, one assess the substantive quality of argumentation systems for public deliberation by their 
capacity to include all the relevant considerations, that is, the relevant factual considerations, 
empirical prognostications, and values.  On the one hand, the external aspect of relevance 
suggests that the system should be able to incorporate all the factual information that would be 
relevant to a successful policy, insofar as success depends on the truth or accuracy of certain 
assumptions about the world and the persons affected by the policy.   Concretely, this means that 
                                                 
15 For a review of automated negotiation systems, see Jennings et al. 2001. 
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the system should be able to draw upon the relevant expertise and make this available to 
participants.  On the other hand, as we have seen such expertise is not the only source of relevant 
information, nor is it usually decisive for a legitimate outcome.  Because relevance also has an 
internal (i.e., participant-relative) sense, substantive quality requires that the value-orientations, 
interests, and other considerations that the participants themselves consider relevant should be 
taken into account by the argumentation system, and thus opened up to public discussion.  Again, 
the formal design features of both systems, Zeno and the Risk Agora, seem to allow for such 
substantive inclusiveness.  Zeno does not seem to restrict the kind of information that can count 
as a “position,” which can include both facts and preferences, and thus it can incorporate, at least 
indirectly, value-orientations.  To be sure, Zeno may prove to be limited in its ability to 
distinguish between mere preferences and deeper values—a limitation that may be a problem in 
some contexts.  Here the Risk Agora goes further, allowing for assertions of various types of 
speech acts (factual claims, claims about what is right, or valuable, and so on; see McBurney and 
Parsons 2001b). 
Secondly, substantive quality also requires that the relevant information and arguments be 
processed in a dialectically responsible manner.  For systems engaged in supporting a human 
participant or participants to construct, evaluate, contest and defend arguments, we may propose 
the following list of evaluative questions for an argumentation system (building on Verheij 1999, 
p. 43):  Does the system track the issues raised? Does it track the assumptions made and the 
reasons adduced?  Does it track the conclusions drawn and the counterarguments adduced?  Does 
it track the justification status of the statements made and the commitments incurred?  Does it 
verify that users obey the pertaining rules of argument?  Does it identify omissions and 
weaknesses in arguments?  Does it identify counter-arguments?  Both Zeno and the Agora meet 
most of these requirements.  The exceptions are:  it is not clear whether and how Zeno handles 
retraction or revision, as was mentioned above; Zeno tracks but does not prohibit violations of its 
rules, so as to permit the greatest possible flexibility to participants (Gordon et al. 1997); and 
neither system identifies weaknesses or omissions in arguments.   
6. Formal Inclusivity 
The third dimension of evaluation is concerned with the extent to which all the stakeholders 
are represented in the world of the computer-aided decision-process.  The formal design features 
of neither Zeno nor the Agora appear to limit participation in any overt way, so that all those 
people interested in the discussion topic and willing to accept the rules of the dialogue are 
permitted to participate (in the case of Zeno) or able to have their views represented (in the case 
of the Agora).  In other words, each system is formally inclusive: it gives anyone an equal right 
to enter the process.  This criterion of formal inclusivity, however, is quite limited.  In particular, 
it leaves two problems unresolved, which reveal the importance of the context-of-use in 
assessing such systems.   
First, formal inclusivity does not mean that all affected parties will in fact avail themselves 
of the system.  One must ask whether all the important human stakeholders in fact involved with 
and through the computer system.  Do all the conversations between them take place through the 
medium of the system, or do some of them occur off-line?  The answers to these questions for 
any system will depend on the specifics of their implementation.  We could imagine, for 
example, a situation where use of Zeno was mandated for an urban planning decision, with all 
stakeholders forced to conduct conversations occurring in and through it.  The system has been 
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designed to support this level of use, and the technical design ensures incorporation and 
integration of information of heterogeneous types (maps, blueprints, reports, email messages, 
etc).    However, without such mandating of use, there is no guarantee that many, and especially 
many important, interactions between stakeholders would not occur away from the system.  
Thus, although argumentation systems may assist in clarifying issues, identifying areas of 
agreement and differences, and deriving the consequences of arguments, so assisting debate, 
much of the debate may in fact occur off-line.  This situation becomes problematic, however, if 
all the relevant contributions are not represented in the system, for then one cannot expect it to 
provide an accurate record of the debate or of the status of various positions.16  
Second, in decision-making contexts the particular formalism itself can present a subtle form 
of exclusion.  For example, if a particular viewpoint rests on styles of argument that are 
excluded—or simply not representable—in the system, then those viewpoints are excluded from 
the start.17  This issue becomes important for types of inferences or arguments whose validity is 
highly context-dependent (e.g., appeals to authority, or to emotions, etc.; see Walton 1995).  This 
danger is lessened in the Agora, which allows participants to challenge and revise the rules.   The 
Zeno system, on the other hand, attempts to avoid a pre-set formalism for generating arguments, 
and it seems to allow participants to choose from a range of burden-of-proof standards; indeed, 
the system even allows users to violate system norms (Gordon and Karacapilidis 1997, pp. 16-
17).  Presumably these features also lessen the danger of inbuilt exclusion, albeit at the cost of 
efficient decision making.   
With these cursory observations, however, one has only scratched the surface.  The 
possibility of still more subtle, context-dependent forms of exclusion and coercion may arise 
from inequalities among participants in their familiarity with rule systems and their computer 
skills, which tend to favor more educated participants.  Generally speaking, inequalities in 
“political capacity”—which can arise in a variety of ways—threaten to engender an elitism of the 
better educated (Bohman 1996, chap. 3).  Although we cannot address this issue here in much 
depth, we can say something about the starting point for such an analysis: what role does the 
system itself play in the deliberation, and how might this steer the deliberative process, for better 
or worse? 
7. The Role of the System in Deliberative Contexts: Toward a Noncoercive Process 
7.1 
Assessing the power of argumentation systems presupposes an understanding of their role(s) 
in deliberation. Like expert systems in general, argumentation systems can play a variety of roles 
in deliberation and decision-making.  Three kinds of role especially interest us here: participant 
                                                 
16 By contrast, in systems of autonomous software agents using argumentation, such as the team-formation 
systems of Dignum et al. (2000), the entirety of the dialogue occurs inside the system. 
17 For example, Gardenfors 1994 discusses the reasoning processes used by illiterate Uzbeki peasants, and 
argues that apparent violations of deductive inference rules are, in fact, differential assessments of argument 
premises according to the perceived experience of the proponent of the premise.  A formalism which did not 
represent this aspect of argument premises would not be able to represent the styles of arguments used by the 
Uzbekis.  
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support, record-keeping (what we will call the “orrery” role), and forum-creation.  We begin by 
simply clarifying how each system plays each of these roles.   
First, then, argumentation systems may support participants.  In fact, the Zeno system 
provides support in a number of ways.  By tracking the deliberation as it unfolds—the changing 
commitments, open questions, and so on—Zeno supports all the human participants, presumably 
in a neutral fashion.   But it can also provide a kind of partisan support insofar as it assists 
participants in their construction of arguments and counterarguments.  Systems that provide this 
type of support have been called argument-assistance systems in artificial intelligence (Verheij 
1999).  Finally, it supports a human moderator or mediator, where this person is not him- or 
herself one of the decision-makers, for example by identifying common assumptions across 
different arguments.  As we have already seen, such mediators play an important role in public 
policy deliberations. Urban planners, for instance, often assist community groups to reach a 
consensus in this manner (Forester 1999).   Indeed, Zeno is designed with just these sorts of 
support in mind.  Although the Risk Agora has a somewhat different aim, by reconstructing 
arguments it not only helps all participants track a debate but can also support individual users as 
they construct their own positions and arguments.  And when the Agora system is fully specified, 
and thus able to support deliberation over the consequences of regulatory options, it may also 
support those tasked with facilitating such decisions. 
Second, the system may play a record-keeping role, or what we call an orrery role, on the 
analogy of mechanical models of the solar system; it is often undertaken so as to achieve an 
understanding the reasoning used in the decision-process.  Each of the two systems records the 
reasoning used to reach a decision, Zeno in real-time and with complete accuracy, the Agora in a 
formal reconstruction of the process.  Indeed, Agora’s main role is the orrery one.18 
Third, an argumentation system may support the entire process of decision-making by 
providing a forum in which to undertake dialogue, with defined protocols for this discourse.   In 
this role the system provides something like a structured space in which participants interact.  
The forum-creating role is central to Zeno’s design.  In contrast, although the Risk Agora is 
designed as a forum for discussion, this is only in an ideal sense, as it provides a forum for the 
reconstruction of arguments rather than for real-time support. 
Note that neither system plays the role of participant or decision-maker.  There are, to be 
sure, argumentation systems envisioned for this more active role, for example the StAR system 
designed for the automated prediction of chemical properties such as toxicity. 19   Such systems 
may replace a human decision-maker, a prospect that has raised concern on the part of 
philosophers and computer scientists.20  When the system plays the role of participant, it needs to 
                                                 
18 Much of the research in the field of AI and Law appears devoted to developing systems which take an orrery 
role, formalizing the reasoning processes used by decision-makers so as to better understand them (Bench-Capon et 
al. Forthcoming). 
19 Tonnelier et al. 1997. Likewise, systems of autonomous software agents assume decision-making is being 
undertaken by computer decision-makers, and much of the research effort of second-generation electronic 
commerce, for instance, is directed at such automated decision-making (Jennings et al. 2001). 
20 The question to what extent humans should delegate decision-making authority to computer systems has 
been discussed in ethical philosophy, though a well-known early objection was raised by AI researcher Joseph 
Weizenbaum 1976; see also Moor 1979, Kuflik 1999.  
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be able to generate, evaluate, contest and defend arguments itself.  This is true even for the 
mediation role, as a mediator may need to find common ground between different positions; for 
example, he or she may need to argue that two opposing positions share common assumptions, 
or that one implies another.  How well a given system executes these tasks will be important in 
any evaluation.    Neither Zeno nor the Agora appears to have the capability to generate, 
evaluate, contest or defend arguments.  For the Agora, acting as an orrery, these capabilities are 
not required.  For Zeno, because the designers do not seek to automate the role of mediator, the 
system can also operate without these capabilities (Gordon and Karacapilidis 1997, p. 11).  
Indeed, from a computer science perspective, the generation of appropriate arguments in a 
dialogue, even using only the limited sets of locutions of Zeno or the Agora, is a challenging 
research problem, and one that is not yet solved.  
Rather, both Zeno and the Agora support responsibility to explain decisions reached through 
their use only insofar as the participants justify their statements to each forum.   The Agora has a 
stronger claim than Zeno to this capability, as the dialogue rules require those participants 
asserting claims to provide arguments justifying these claims when questioned or contested.  It is 
not clear that similar requirements are incurred by the participants in Zeno.   
7.2 
With the roles of each system clarified, we are in a position to sketch the assessment issues 
raised by the insinuations of power in deliberative processes.  Expert systems raise a number of 
questions in this regard:  What is the institutional status of computational-deliberative results?  
On whose behalf is the system developed and deployed?  Who should have rights to its 
findings?—and so on.21  These questions illustrate the issues that may arise from an examination 
of the social and institutional relationships surrounding the use of any decision-support 
technology.   None of these questions has a straightforward answer, and just resolution may only 
be possible on a case-by-case basis.  Exploring them, one is confronted with those whom in 
sociology have been called “the locally powerful” (Bell 1978) – people who influence or control 
the decisions of others, even if only in a particular context.  In the present context, one would 
expect the locally powerful to include users who are especially adept at employing the 
argumentation system to support their viewpoint, or those users whose style of reasoning and 
public representation is favored by the system formalism.  The danger in such inequality is that 
the more powerful players—perhaps even despite their good intentions—would fail to give some 
viewpoints the consideration they deserve on the merits.  Viewpoints and arguments would be 
hastily dismissed, not given an adequate hearing.  These non-standard approaches would thus be 
subtly forced out of the deliberative forum. 
In this scenario, the quality of the deliberation is harmed in a number of ways.  
Substantively, relevant considerations are not duly taken into account.  Such truncation can in 
itself lead to policies that are less than adequately informed, even about certain factual 
considerations, and are thus less likely to prove successful.22  But truncated deliberations can also 
                                                 
21 Such questions arise, for example, in the use of intelligent systems in medical domains.  See, for example, 
Emery et al. 1999. 
22 A tragic example of this point is the Challenger launch decision; according to Vaughan (1996), the mistaken 
decision stemmed in part from deliberative inequalities and subtle forms of exclusion and coercion in NASA 
decision-making, which consequently led managers to underestimate important data.  
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mean that the interests and values of some parties are overlooked, a deficit that is bound to 
damage the legitimacy of the outcome, its acceptability to all those expected to comply with the 
decision at issue.  Finally, by not considering some viewpoints sufficiently, possibilities for self-
transformation would be missed, both by those with power and those lacking it. 
We are thus brought back to the issue broached in Section 3, regarding the freedom of the 
participants for a reasonable self-transformation.  Only now we cannot define such 
reasonableness by appealing to the argumentative mechanisms built into the system, the formal 
design features treated in Sections 4-6.  For now it is precisely such features—the dialectical 
formalism and formal inclusivity—that are in question.  We are asking how such system features 
perform, how they are actually used, in particular contexts.  Thus one must rather have recourse 
to what Habermas (1990, pp. 88-89), drawing on Alexy (1978/1990), has dubbed “process” 
criteria.  Although Alexy’s first criterion is that of formal inclusivity, we are now concerned 
above all with those criteria or “rules” that define the freedom of participants to construct and 
reconstruct their viewpoints within discourse.23  The decisive critical perspective behind such 
criteria is this: to what extent does the deliberation—as a social interaction—allow participants 
rationally and freely to adopt and change their viewpoints, that is, solely on the basis of an 
insight into the better argument?  The rules that define such freedom call for equal, coercion-free 
participation in the process itself.  Thus one might summarize the requirement this way:  each 
participant should have an equal freedom to express and revise his or her viewpoints, feelings, 
interests, questions, and so on.  Such a requirement cannot be guaranteed by any concrete set of 
formal rules; rather it involves an “idealization” that actual discourses and deliberation only 
rarely satisfy in full.  However, if participants are to consider deliberative outcomes as 
trustworthy or legitimate, then they must suppose that their actual deliberative process has at 
least approximated this idealization.  More precisely, the actual process of argumentation must 
supply participants with the sense that their positions are ones that could hold up under idealized 
conditions of discourse (see Habermas 1993, pp. 49-57). 
Applying these process criteria takes us beyond the assessment of formal design in abstracto 
to its performance in concrete deliberative contexts.  One can, to be sure, design the formal 
features of system with something like Alexy’s criteria in mind. In doing so, one sees to it that 
the system formalism makes provision for the various kinds of argumentative moves that 
participants should each be able to employ if they are to represent and change their views.  Our 
assessment of substantive quality suggests that the two systems to some extent incorporate, as 
formal design features, aspects of Alexy’s rules.  In fact, McBurney and Parsons (2001c) are 
quite explicit about this: they show that the Risk Agora implements an applicable subset of 
Alexy’s rules of discourse ethics (Alexy 1978/1990) and 15 of Hitchcock’s 18 principles of 
rational mutual enquiry (Hitchcock 1991).  Zeno seems to have a lesser capacity to represent 
different types of speech acts, and its dialogue-game rules are not articulated (at least, in the 
publications known to us), but it does allow for participants to represent and change their 
                                                 
23 Habermas (1990, p. 89) highlights the following rules: each participant is allowed to question any assertion, 
to introduce any assertions whatsoever, and to express his or her attitudes, desires, and needs, and no participant 
may be prevented from exercising these rights by internal or external coercion. 
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preferences.24   But formal design mechanisms and their abstract assessment leave open the 
critical question that is decisive for the process level: how well participants of diverse 
backgrounds and capacities make actual use of this formalism in concrete contexts of use 
remains an open research question.   It is true that the identification and formal demonstration of 
the discourse properties of a system will provide confidence to its users.  In the final analysis, 
however, such systems will be successfully implemented only insofar as parties to deliberations 
actually use the systems and consider computer-assisted outcomes as superior.   
At the process level, then, the pertinent question is this: how well does the actual use of the 
argumentation systems for a given deliberation lead to an outcome that is legitimate, that is, 
reasonable in light of argumentative idealizations?  Given the different roles delineated above, 
specific questions such as the following become important. Again, these questions are more 
illustrative than exhaustive of the possibilities. 
First, given the particular context of use, do the support mechanisms favor some participants 
over others?  Here the partisan support role merits particular scrutiny.  Is argument-assistance 
equally available to each participant?  Is the system flexible enough to capture all the various 
styles of argument that might plausibly merit consideration? 
Second, given the particular context of use, is the tracking or record-keeping genuinely 
“neutral”?  Marxist and postmodern critics of power have cast serious doubt on ideals of 
neutrality (e.g., Harding 1998).  The crucial question here may perhaps be formulated in a more 
concrete manner as follows: Can each affected party perceive that the system has represented its 
position, interests, values, and arguments accurately?  Again, the flexibility of the system 
formalism becomes an important factor in system quality. 
The third area for questions involves the system as a forum.  Here the basic question follows 
directly from the idealizing requirement above: given the particular context of use, is the forum 
one in which each party has an equal opportunity to present and argue for its viewpoint—and is 
equally free to reconstruct its position in the light of the counterarguments?  
8. Conclusions  
This paper has explored a number of evaluative issues associated with the use of computer 
decision support systems for public deliberation, in particular the Zeno system of Gordon and 
Karacapilidis and their colleagues at GMD and the Risk Agora of McBurney and Parsons.   We 
have argued that assessments of the quality of such systems present challenges to system 
designers and users, and we have suggested a conceptual structure within which to undertake 
such assessments. This structure draws on deliberative democratic theory as developed in 
Forester’s (1999) framework for assessment of deliberative planning processes.  Our analysis 
indicates that the formal design features of the two argumentation systems capture many of the 
features of reasonable argumentation—mechanisms for ensuring substantive inclusiveness of 
relevant considerations, dialectically responsible argumentation, and an overtly open forum of 
participation.  But these properties do not ensure high quality performance in the actual 
                                                 
24 Although similar procedural criteria have been proposed for assessment of automatic electronic auction 
systems (Sandholm 1999), to our knowledge this is the first time such proposals have been made for argumentation-
based computer systems. 
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deliberative contexts of use.  For that, all the parties affected by a policy decision must actually 
avail themselves of the system and, in addition, find that the system increases their understanding 
of the issue, their ability to voice their concerns, and their confidence that outcomes and 
decisions are thereby superior to what they would otherwise have been.   
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